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Change Management Models

Change Management Models

Order Description
Review the change models presented in Chapter 8 of the Palmer textbook. Using attributes from these models, create a unique change management model that would be most effective for your organization and justify why this model would be effective.
Chapter 8
Implementing Change: Change Management, Contingency, and Processual Approaches
Learning objectives
On completion of this chapter you should be able to:
• Appreciate more clearly the organizational change approaches underpinning the director and navigator images of managing change.
• Understand the change management approach to change.
• Outline contingency approaches to change.
• Appreciate current debates between OD and change management approaches to change.
• Be familiar with the processual approach to managing change.
• Reflect upon your own approach to managing change.
This chapter continues from the previous chapter by considering the other two images of managing change, the director and navigator images, which also have strong foundations in the organizational change field (as distinct from the organization theory field) and also assume, in various ways, that the change manager has an important influence on the initiation, support, and outcomes of organizational change.
We commence this chapter by considering the director image. This image underpins the change management approaches that are often associated with the work of many large consulting companies. Adherents to these approaches take a strategic view of organizational change and make no apology for taking a pragmatic, managerialist view of how to go about achieving lasting organizational change. Within the change management field are a variety of models to choose from, each with a series of steps that need to be followed. One consequence of this variety is that it is not clear which change management model should be followed or what criteria should be used to choose among the models offered.
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Addressing this problem are contingency approaches. These are still underpinned by the director image, but rather than claiming to have the “one best approach” for all types of organizational change, contingency change theorists and practitioners take an “it depends” approach in which the style of change, especially the style of change leadership, is dependent on the scale of the proposed change and the readiness of staff to receive it.
However, this notion of getting the right “fit” between the type of change and the manner for achieving it runs counter to processual approaches to viewing change. Drawing on the navigator image, these approaches see change as a political and disputed process that emerges over time and varies according to the context in which it is attempted.1 These approaches are outlined in the discussion that follows.
Director Image of Managing Change: Change Management and Contingency Approaches
In this section, we consider first a variety of change management approaches to organizational change and debates associated with whether they have supplanted the OD approaches discussed in the previous chapter. We then discuss the contingency approaches and consider why their impact has been less prevalent than the change management approaches.
Change Management Approaches
Common to the various change management approaches is that they provide multistep models of how to achieve large-scale, transformational change. Table 8.1 provides nine examples of these models that entail anywhere from a 5-step to a 13-step version of how change should proceed. These (and other) models differ not just in terms of the number of steps but whether all steps need to be followed, whether they need to be followed in sequence, and whether they need to be adapted to specific settings.2
Kirkpatrick portrays his seven “step-by-step” change model as “a systematic approach” which “should be followed to ensure that the best decisions are made and that the changes will be accepted by those involved.”3 Mento, Jones, and Dirndorfer present their model as being based on both theory and practice4 and suggest that their 12 steps “are not to be regarded only sequentially, but also as an integrated process to enable change.”5 Pendlebury, Grouard, and Meston6 write that although their “Ten Keys” model may be adapted to suit particular change circumstances, omission of the various keys will likely lead to transformational failure. Most keys need to be implemented simultaneously and continuously during a change process, although some play a greater role in differing change phases compared to others. For example, they point out that:
•Discontinuous change is more likely to be associated with static environments and in this situation all keys “need to be applied scrupulously,” whereas
•In dynamic environments, where change is continuous, keys two (mobilize), three (catalyze), seven (handle emotions), and eight (handle power) “will be less vital”7 since staff will be more accustomed to change.
In this model, adapting the method appears to mean weighing the degree to which various keys are applied, not whether they are applied.
Nadler8 maintains, in relation to his “12 Action Steps” change management framework, that it “can be adapted and applied by executives and managers at every level of
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the organization, providing immensely useful tools for initiating, leading, and managing change in every corner of the organization.”9 He depicts discontinuous change as being a continuous cycle rather than a linear process and identifies three core elements that need to be managed during the transformational process:10
•The need to manage organizational power, as depicted in steps 1 to 4 (see Table 8.1).
•The need to motivate people to participate in the change, in particular dealing with the anxieties associated with change, as depicted in steps 5 to 8.
•The need to manage the transition itself, as depicted in steps 9 to 12.
While pointing to the importance of all steps, Nadler accepts that some steps will need to be emphasized more in some change situations compared to others and that the order of the steps may vary according to the change situation.11 Taffinder12 makes similar points in relation to his five “transformation trajectories” (see Table 8.1). These trajectories are not linear but multidimensional; their starting points are staggered; some actions are dependent upon others’ actions; however, their sequence is context specific, as is the emphasis that needs to be placed on each transition line. Anderson and Anderson echo these sentiments when pointing out that their “Change Process Model can be tailored for all types of change, as well as any magnitude of change effort.”13 They emphasize that their model should be seen as a way of thinking for change managers, who may be simultaneously operating with up to four change phases at once.14
Similar to the models presented in Table 8.1 is the work of Ghoshal and Bartlett,15 who argue for the importance “of sequencing and implementation of activities in a change process.”16 They identify three distinct but interrelated transformational change phases:
•Rationalization (streamlining company operations).
•Revitalization (leveraging resources and linking opportunities across the whole organization).
•Regeneration (managing business unit operations and tensions, while at the same time collaborating elsewhere in the organization to achieve performance).17
They claim that while change is often presented as difficult and messy, there is nothing mystical about the process of achieving change with effective changes following the rationalization, revitalization, and regeneration sequential process.18 Going through these change phases is not necessarily easy, with the process being akin to the transformation of a caterpillar into a butterfly: “It goes blind, its legs fall off, and its body is torn apart as the beautiful wings emerge. Similarly, transforming a hierarchical bureaucracy into a flexible, self-generating company can be painful, and it requires enormous courage from those who must lead the process of change.”19
Of the change management models presented in Table 8.1, Kanter, Stein, and Jick20 adopt a reflective position in commenting upon the utility of their “Ten Commandments”:
•First, they point out that how they are practiced and interpreted will vary according to the particular change maker group in question (strategists, implementers, and recipients). For example, while change strategists may view a change as urgent, a change recipient might view it quite differently if, in their eyes, it may lead to them being laid off.
•Second, multiple changes may be in progress so that what constitutes the notion of the past may be difficult to determine.
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TABLE 8.1
Planned Change Management Models: Examples from 1992 to 2006
Source: The models are variously paraphrased and/or reproduced from the authors as listed in each column.
Kanter,
Stein, and
Jick (1992) Pendlebury,
Crouard,
and Meston
(1998) Nadler (1998) Taffinder
(1998) Anderson and
Anderson
(2001) Kirkpatrick
(2001) Mento,
Jones, and
Dirndorfer
(2002) Light
(2005) Leppitt (2006)
Ten
Commandments Ten Keys 12 Action Steps Transformation
Trajectory Nine-Phase
Change Process
Model Step-by-Step
Change
Model 12-Step
Framework RAND’s Six
Steps Integrated
Model
1.Analyze the need for change 1.Define the vision 1.Get support of key power groups 1.Awaken 1.Prepare to lead the change 1.Determine the need or desire for change 1.Highlight the need for change 1.Create a sense of urgency 1.Understand the context
2.Create a shared vision 2.Mobilize 2.Get leaders to model change behavior 2.Conceive the future 2.Create organizational vision, commitment, and capacity 2.Prepare tentative plans 2.Define what is the change 2.Remove the barriers to success 2.Understand the vision and strategy
3.Separate from the past 3.Catalyze 3.Use symbols and language 3.Build the agenda of change 3.Assess the situation to determine design requirements 3.Analyze probable reactions 3.Evaluate the climate for change 3.Recruit the champions 3.Create and communicate the urgency for change
4.Create a sense of urgency 4.Steer 4.Define areas of stability 4.Deliver big change 4.Design the desired state 4.Make a final decision 4.Develop a change plan 4.Build internal momentum 4.Build consensus for the change
5.Support a strong leader role 5.Deliver 5.Surface dissatisfaction with the present conditions 5.Master the change 5.Analyze the impact 5.Establish a timetable 5.Find and cultivate a sponsor 5.Prove that change works 5.Establish clear leadership
6.Line up political sponsorship 6.Obtain participation 6.Promote participation in change 6.Plan and organize for implementation 6.Communicate the change 6.Prepare the recipients of change 6.Keep experimenting 6.Build organizational capability
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7.Craft an implementation plan 7.Handle emotions 7.Reward behavior that supports change 7.Implement the change 7.Implement the change 7.Create a cultural fit to make the change last 7.Plan what resources will be needed
8.Develop enabling structures 8.Handle power 8.Disengage from the old 8.Celebrate and integrate the new state 8.Choose and devleop a change leader 8.Plan the life cycle of the change
9.Communicate and involve people 9.Train and coach 9.Develop and clearly communicate image of the future 9.Learn and course correct 9.Retain motivation by creating small wins 9.Secure needed resources
10.Reinforce and institutionalize change 10.Actively communicate 10.Use multiple leverage points 10.Communicate change constantly and strategically 10.Have a clear change management delivery structure
11.Develop transition management arrangements 11.Measure the change progress 11.Enable quick wins
12.Create feedback 12.Integrate the lessons learned from the change 12.Establish and monitor change metrics
13.Consolidate and integrate change lessons
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•Third, the change commandments need to be tailored to the needs of each organization; the commandments themselves may even form the source of debate within an organization in terms of how best to proceed.
•Fourth, they highlight the need for communication about change to be not just about passing on information but about allowing differing voices to be heard in the change process and engaging in dialogue with differing groups affected by the change.
•Fifth, they note that underpinning the 10 commandments is an assumption of action: “But this focus on action assumes a level of control that simply doesn’t exist when large-scale change is being implemented. Those who want to embrace change must be as adept at reacting as they are at acting.”21
•Sixth, they point to a paradox underlying the 10 commandments—that they help provide change strategists and implementers with the means of controlling change at precisely the time that the opposite is required: “while the commandments may serve to minimize failure, maximize control and predictability, and define the end state, a transformation may actually require maximizing experimentation and risk taking, tolerating unknowable consequences, and evolving toward—rather than targeting—an end state.”22
•Seventh, they point out that although the change model calls for a strong leader, the reality may be one of multiple leaders in an organization “wrestling with how change is to be managed, and by whom.”23
Given these ambiguities, they maintain that “muddling along” and taking one stage at a time may be the most appropriate means of handling complex changes.24 They conclude that “(a)lthough managing change will never be easy, with the right attitude and approach, it can be a most gratifying adventure.”25
Possibly one of the best-known change management models, now widely regarded as a classic in the field, is John Kotter’s eight-step model.26 First published in 1995 as an article in the Harvard Business Review(HBR), it became HBR’s most requested article for reprints in that year.27 Subsequently, the article was expanded in 1996 into a book titled Leading Change, which was expanded further in 2002 with another book titled The Heart of Change. Table 8.2 provides a summary of his classic model.
While Kotter acknowledges that his framework simplifies the change process and that “even successful change efforts are messy and full of surprises,”28 he maintains that following the eight phases he outlines is important for achieving successful change and that “[s]kipping steps creates only the illusion of speed and never produces a satisfying result.”29 He argues that successful change follows a “see–feel–change” pattern in which problems need to be presented in a compelling way that captures the attention of others; this awakens in them feelings about the need for change; and the change itself reinforces new behaviors. Without dismissing an alternative “analysis–think–change” pattern, he argues that the “see–feel–change” pattern is more motivating for people to engage in change.30
Is Change Management Supplanting OD?
Some writers argue that as the relevance of OD came into question, so did this lead to a rise in interest in change management models. This raises the question: are change management models supplanting OD? There is no simple way of answering this question. However, what is of interest is an analysis of the key social science electronic database, ABInform.
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TABLE 8.2
Kotter’s Eight-Step Change Management Model
Source: Adapted from Kotter, 1995:61; 1996:21.
Step Actions
1.Establish the need for urgency • Perform market analyses
• Determine problems and opportunities
• Use techniques to focus people’s attention on the importance of change to meet these challenges
2.Ensure there is a powerful change group to guide the change • Create team structures to help drive the change
• Ensure teams have sufficient power to achieve the desired change
3.Develop a vision • Develop a vision that provides a focus for the change
4.Communicate the vision • Role model the behavior implied by the vision
• Use multiple channels to constantly communicate the vision
5.Empower staff • Remove organizational policies and structures that inhibit achievement of the vision
• Encourage risk taking
6.Ensure there are short-term wins • Wins help support need for change
• Rewarding
“ wins” helps to provide motivation
7.Consolidate gains • Continue to remove organizational policies and processes that inhibit change
• Reward those who engage positively with the change
• Establish new, related change projects
8.Embed the change in the culture • Link change to organizational performance and leadership
EXERCISE 8.1
Experiencing Change
This exercise is designed for people who have had some experience of organizational change. For those who lack this experience, you may wish to get someone else’s perspective on what follows and use this information to frame your responses.
In any change process, there are usually three change groups:31
•Change strategists are those individuals or groups who legitimate or sanction organizational changes. Most often these people occupy senior management positions.
•Those who are responsible for implementing change, often middle management, are known as change implementers.
•Those people who are the recipients of change (knowledge, skills, attitudes, etc.) are known as change recipients.
Divide into two groups: those who have been change strategists/implementers and those who have been change recipients.
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Change Strategists/Implementers Group
1.What type of change did you attempt? (List these in your group.)
2.How was the change received by the change targets?
3.What was the most frustrating part? Why? (List these in your group.)
4.How would you rate your success in achieving the desired change? What would you do differently next time? Why?
Change Recipients Group
1.What types of changes were attempted? (List these in your group.)
2.What was your response to the attempted change?
3.What was the most frustrating part? Why? (List these in your group.)
4.How would you rate management’s implementation of the change? What should they do differently next time? Why?
Process
Each group will have 25 minutes to respond to the above questions. Appoint a spokesperson to give a 5-minute presentation to the rest of the class. What similarities and differences emerge looking at change from these different perspectives?
We conducted a count of articles with the words “organization development” and “change management” in their titles over a 27-year period, 1980 to 2006 inclusive. Figure 8.1 reveals some interesting patterns, with the vertical axis representing the number of publication titles and the horizontal axis the time period. In total, there were 428 references to change management titles and 306 references to OD titles. One reading of this might suggest that change management dominated interest over this time period.
A closer study of the pattern reveals an interesting shift. OD dominated discussion for the first fourteen years, from 1980 to 1993 (except for two years, 1988 and 1991). However, change management has dominated discussion in every year since 1994. Indeed, for the last 10 years we surveyed (1997 to 2006 inclusive), 78 percent of all references to change
EXERCISE 8.2
Developing Your Own Change Management Model
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 set out 10 change management models:
•Compare and contrast the various steps in these models. What is left out of different models?
•Create your own composite model—do this part of the activity in a group if possible.
•Is there a preferred sequence of steps? Why?
•Identify two or three key management skills associated with each step. Which ones are you strongest on? Weakest on?
•Where you have experience of organizational change, which steps have been best handled? Worst handled? Why?
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FIGURE 8.1
ABInform—Change Management versus Organization Development in article titles 1980–2006

management occurred (335 out of 428) whereas only 43 percent of all references to organization development occurred (130 out of 206). This suggests that since the mid-1990s, there has been a surge in use of the title “change management” and a relative decline overall in the use of the title “organization development.”
Very clearly, this is a limited test of the level of continuing interest in these two change traditions. For example, neither term captures all that encompasses each field; other articles are undoubtedly in the database that are relevant to each field but that do not mention either one or the other of the terms in their titles; and the database represents what is being written about—the discourse of change—which is not necessarily a reflection of what is actually being practiced in organizations.
Nevertheless, and acknowledging these limitations, the table does provide an indication of what appears to be a dramatic increase in attention being paid to the term “change management” in the decade since the late 1990s compared to the term “organization development.” However, OD has been around for a long time and remains a staple part of many change agents’ repertoires. Indeed, one point of note in Figure 8.1 is the year 2006, where there was a dramatic increase in the use of “organization development” (30, up from 12 in the previous year), not far behind use of the term “change management” (38, down from 46 in the previous year). Time will tell whether this convergence continues as a trend. As argued in the previous chapter, OD may be under threat and going through a period of deep introspection, but its lasting influences are straight-forward and undeniable, including its morphing into new areas such as positive organizational scholarship.
OD-Change Management Debates
Change management as a field is depicted by OD writers as the brash child of the large consulting companies. Lacking the underlying tenets of the OD value system, it is seen as a set of value-neutral change practices harnessed up to assist management in achieving greater financial performance in their organizations.32 Consultants are not facilitators or coaches
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(as in an OD model) so much as directors and advisers on best practices and strategies. Integration is at the heart of change management, aligning new changes to desired outcomes.
This has led to a debate about the relationship between OD and change management, a term often associated with fundamental, strategic change. Church sees, under the influence of non-OD change consultants, a shift in mentality of some OD practitioners toward a vendor mindset. This, he argues, is one of three forces “converging on the ultimate demise of O.D. as a field.”33 (The other two forces are a shift in OD values away from humanism toward a bottom-line focus and a lack of clarity regarding what it is that unifies the OD field.34) While some OD advocates seek greater clarification of what constitutes the OD field,35 or of trying to figure out how the field should be “rewired,”36 for other writers OD is now largely irrelevant: OD practitioners lack an understanding of business practices, OD departments in organizations are not growing, and there is a lack of interest in OD by both executives and MBA students.37
While drawing on a number of OD’s techniques, change management is said to have supplanted rather than extended OD as a new field. This has occurred in three ways:
•First, theoretically, this new field has a broader scope than OD, considering human performance and development as one feature of organizational change efforts but related to other issues such as technology, operations, and strategy.
•Second, the role of the classic OD practitioner is as a third-party facilitator or coach. Contrary to this, the change management consultant operates with technical knowledge and as part of a team consisting of skill sets that cover a range of strategy and organizational areas.
•Third, OD is presented as changing individual attitudes and ideas as a prelude to wider structural changes in an organization. Change management is contrasted with this on the grounds that it is through structural changes that new behaviors are assumed to emerge.38
EXERCISE 8.3
OD versus Change Management: The Great Debate
Think about the arguments about OD and change management approaches to organizational change in this chapter and in the previous chapter. As an in-class exercise, divide into two groups, with one the “OD group” and the other the “change management” group. Debate one or both of the following propositions:
“That the demise of OD is long overdue.”
or
“Change management approaches lack a concern for humanity.”
•What conclusions do you reach?
•What key issues emerge?
Defenders of OD accept a number of limitations of the field. However, they point to an alignment of change management with management consulting and criticize it for adopting faddist, holy-grail-type solutions to client problems in which the consultant is an “omniscient expert.”39 They claim that proponents of change management have misrepresented the OD field. They point to how its scope has grown to include strategic issues with its practitioners now approaching organizational problems from “a holistic and integrated perspective.”40
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They argue the need for a people-focused perspective on organizations and maintain “that creating a new discipline based on the models of consulting firms is misguided.”41
In reply, supporters of change management models acknowledge evidence of a more strategic focus in OD but criticize the profession for still being dominated by traditional practitioner perspectives. Some of the language may have changed but not the underlying practices. They indicate that it is through embracing the change management field with its strategic focus and working with planners and information technology specialists that OD practitioners can collaborate to achieve organizational change.42
For their part, OD practitioners are concerned about integrating OD with change management, one writer “wondering whether or not this is simply a specious attempt on our part on having our cake and eating it too, an effort at keeping our values while becoming relevant to business executives. Right now I think this is probably the case.”43
Clearly this debate has yet to be fully played out. Some defend the OD approach—and the continuing relevance of Kurt Lewin’s underpinning work—claiming that many of the criticisms leveled against it are “unfounded and/or based on a narrow interpretation.”44 Others adopt a different position, with Heracleous45 concluding that greater interaction is needed between the OD field and the strategic change management field, neither side being sufficiently aware of how the potential of the other can enhance radical organizational change. By way of example is Sminia and van Nistelrooij’s case study of a change program in UVW, a public sector organization in the Netherlands responsible for administering employee benefits. They argue that a top-down strategic change management approach can be combined with a more bottom-up OD approach. However, they point out that the support of top management to both approaches is critical to their successful integration.46 In relation to UVW, they conclude that the OD logic did not permeate the change process fully because of senior management’s unwillingness to share power with employees. Perhaps because of such examples, Bradford and Burke warn that care is needed in integrating OD with various change management approaches as this can lead to “the danger of pseudo-OD, where organization members are involved in change projects, not to tap into their knowledge but to gain their compliance.”47
Contingency Approaches
While change management models contain variation and flexibility, an underlying assumption is that there is “one best way” of producing organizational change—although it is not clear which of the various models offered is the best one for the manager of change to follow. Contingency theorists challenge this assumption and argue that the style of change will depend upon the scale of the change and the receptivity of organizational members for engaging in the change.
The best-developed change contingency approach is associated with the work of Dexter Dunphy and Doug Stace. In their book, published in 1990, titled Under New Management, they set out a comprehensive “it depends” approach to understanding the style of change that should be adopted. This was subsequently developed in their 1994 (first edition) and their 2001 (second edition) book Beyond the Boundaries as well as in other articles.48 The initial research for their approach was based on a sample of 20 Australian organizations. They argue that the style of change (collaborative, consultative, directive, or coercive), as well as the scale of the change (fine-tuning, incremental adjustment, modular transformation, or corporate transformation) has to be matched to the needs of the organization.49 Their model is set out in Figure 8.2.
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FIGURE 8.2
Dunphy/Stace Contingency Model of Change
Source: © 2001 Doug Stace and Dexter Murphy, “Beyond the Boundaries: Leading and Recreating the Successful Enterprise,” second edition, McGraw-Hill Australia, p. 109.

They identify five main change approaches:
•By developmental transitions, they refer to situations in which there is constant change as a result of the organization adapting itself to external, environmental changes. The primary style of leadership is consultative, where the leader acts in the capacity of a coach aiming to gain voluntary, shared commitment from organizational members to the need for continual improvement.
•In task-focused transitions, the change management style is directive with the change leader acting as a captain seeking the compliance of organizational members to redefine how the organization operates in specific areas. While directive leadership means that the overall change is driven from the top, this may translate into a more consultative approach by managers operating lower down in the organization who are required to implement the changes.
•With charismatic transformation, people accept that the organization is out of step with its environment and that there is a need for radical, revolutionary change. Helping to create a new identity and a paradigm shift in the way in which the organization conducts its operations, the charismatic leader is able to operate symbolically to gain emotional commitment of staff to new directions.
•Whereas charismatic transformation is aimed at inspirational change, turnarounds are aimed at frame-breaking changes. Turnaround change leaders operate as commanders utilizing their positions of power to force required changes through the organization. This coercive/directive change style is argued to be needed where there is little staff support for change and little time available to the organization to seek their engagement and participation in how the organization should be reshaped.
•A fifth category in their model, Taylorism, is associated with fine-tuning, paternalistic approaches to managing change.50
In their view, one way of thinking of these approaches is to view them as differing “paths of change”51 that organizations might adopt at different periods of time. For example, they propose that:
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•Where organizations predominantly use fine-tuning, they will probably need to use charismatic transformation or turnaround at some stage to reinvigorate themselves.
•In order for turnarounds to be successful over time, a variety of task-focused transitions in different business units are likely to be needed.
•Because of the difficulty of keeping charismatic transformations going over the longer term, developmental transitions are likely to be needed to embed the changes into the organization.
•Where developmental or task-focused transitions are not seen to be delivering the desired changes, then charismatic transformations or turnaround change strategies are likely to be called for.52
They suggest that, overall, their research indicates that medium- to high-performance organizations are likely to be using consultative and directive change management styles while those using fine-tuning or Taylorism are likely to be least successful, especially given the hypercompetitive business environment.53 Notwithstanding this, they argue that rather than having a dominant ideology of how change should occur in an organization, more effective managers and organizations are more comfortable adopting differing change styles depending upon the prevailing circumstances.54
Another contingency approach appears in the work of Huy,55 who categorizes change into four ideal types:
•The commanding change intervention is one where the time period is short term, abrupt, and rapid. Change is usually implemented by senior executives who demand compliance from organizational members. Changes may well include downsizing, outsourcing, and divestments.
•The engineering intervention is oriented toward a medium-term, relatively fast-change perspective and often assisted by work design analysts who assist in changing work and operational systems. The change agent acts as an analyst in this process.
•The teaching intervention takes a more gradual, longer-term OD change perspective. Assisted by outside process consultants, staff are taught how to probe their work practices and behaviors to reveal new ways of working.
•The socializing intervention is also gradual and long term. It sees change as developing through participative experiential learning based on self-monitoring, democratic organizational processes.56
EXERCISE 8.4
Does This Go with That? What’s Your Experience?
The contingency approach to change identifies five change styles:
•Developmental transitions
•Task-focused transitions
•Charismatic transformations
•Turnarounds
•Taylorist
In groups, see if you can conduct research to identify examples of organizational changes that fall into one or more of the above categories.
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•To what extent were these successful? Using what criteria?
•Can you identify change “paths,” that is, where an organization used more than one change process at different points in time? Can you find out whether the leader adopted a different style; for example, directive in one change, participative in another?
•Are you able to determine if there was a credibility issue that needed to be addressed where this occurred? Do you know how successful this was? What new skills might have been required?
•Were these mainly top-down or bottom-up changes? Or were they a combination of these two? What implications emerge from this?
Each ideal type has its limitations. The commanding approach may lead to resentment and rarely produces lasting behavioral change; the teaching approach is very individualistic and may not be aligned to corporate strategic objectives; the engineering approach may not encourage collaboration and spread of change across business units; and the socializing approach may lead to overfocusing on individual work groups rather than on how they may operate as part of a larger, corporate collective.57
Why Contingency Approaches Are Not Dominant
While some change commentators “are convinced that contingency reasoning is inevitable,”58 it is interesting nevertheless to consider why contingency approaches still remain less prevalent than the “one-best-way” change management approaches. In making this statement, we note that contingency approaches are framed around questions concerning the applicability of change management programs to differing times, leadership styles, and situations. In an article in 2001 in the Academy of Management Journal, these questions of time and situation were referred to by Pettigrew, Woodman, and Cameron59 as the “more difficult questions” but ones that are “largely unstudied and inadequately understood” in the change field. We identify the following contributing reasons for the relative lack of “voice” given to contingency approaches:
•First, the notion of “fitting” an organizational change program to the type of change required may be easier to articulate in theory than to deliver in practice. Differing perceptions may exist about what is the required fit and what is the best strategic set of actions to employ. As Leppitt60 argues, managers are likely to be limited by their own “eclectic knowledge” of change situations and associated variables and this will affect the change management choices they make in what they think will “fit” a particular change situation.
•Second, compared to the “off-the-shelf” neatness and simplicity offered by the change management models outlined above, contingency approaches are more ambiguous and require greater choice and decisions by managers about what type of change situation they are facing and therefore which avenue to pursue.
•Third, the main focus of contingency approaches is on the specific style of leadership, matched to the scale of required change, rather than on a specific set of change action steps. Hence, contingency approaches may be less attractive in practice to senior managers who lack the skills to adopt differing modes of leading, depending upon the particular change circumstances.
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•Fourth, if an organization is to adopt differing “paths of change” and employ differing styles of change leadership at differing times and in association with differing changes, this raises the question about the credibility or sincerity with which staff view senior management actions—adopting differing behaviors at differing times, sometimes participative and sometimes directive.
•Fifth, there is a question about “what” is contingent to managing change. Are there some things that are not contingent but are universal to all changes (and, if so, what? why? and how do we know this with any certainty?) and are there other things that vary (and, if so, what? why? and how do we know this with any certainty?).
Navigator Images of Managing Change: Processual Approaches
Processual approaches share an assumption with contingency theory that change unfolds differently over time and according to the context in which the organization finds itself; however, they part company from contingency theory in assuming “that change should not be and cannot be solidified, or seen as a series of linear events within a given period of time; instead, it is viewed as a continuous process,”61 one that has “no clear beginning or end.”62
Pettigrew’s extensive and detailed study of change and stability from the 1960s to the 1980s in Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), a major UK chemical company, provides the backdrop to the development of this approach. Pettigrew starts off from a position of being critical of linear, rational, and planned theories of change. For him, the key to understanding organizational change “is to identify the variety and mixture of causes of change, to examine the juxtaposition of the rational and the political, the quest for efficiency and power, the role of exceptional men (sic) and of extreme circumstances, the untidiness of change, forces in the environment, and to explore some of the conditions in which mixtures of these occur.”63 He argues for a political and contextual view of change: Change is best understood as a complex interplay between content, process, and context.64 This recognizes that there are different interest groups in organizations that have differing rationalities around goals, time, language, and behavior, all of which influence how organizational change occurs.65
He points out that change at ICI went through periods of revolution followed by relatively long periods of stability or incremental adjustments.66 New rationalities and changes from the existing order emerged through:
insubordinate minorities, often in very senior line positions sensing environmental change and organizational inertia, developing a widening caucus of concern around new problem areas for the firm, using cognitive and analytical skill to fashion new rationalities and ideas to compete in the strategy formulation process, and seizing on the opportunities provided by environmental change to put together new marriages of strategic content and context.67
Adopting a political and cultural view of change for Pettigrew means recognizing “that intervening in an organization to create strategic change is likely to be a challenge to the dominating ideology, culture, and systems of meaning and interpretation, as well as the structures, priorities, and power relations of the organization.”68 This situation “makes it clearer why and how the processes of sensing, justifying, creating, and stabilizing strategic change can be so tortuous and long.”69
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What Does Managing Change Mean from a Processual Approach?
Pettigrew argues that “creating strategic change is in essence a long-term conditioning, educating, and influence process designed to establish the dominating legitimacy of a different pattern of relation between strategic context and content.”70 This means that managers of change need to examine the context of change in order to identify sources of continuity as well as performance gaps and misfits: “Context and continuity shape the starting point in which change processes emerge, falter, and proceed.”71 By context he refers to external context (economic, political, and competitive environment) as well as internal context (strategy, structure, culture, and power relations). In this sense, context provides both constraints and opportunities for managers of change.72 For him the challenging question is: “Is it possible to describe and codify the tasks and skills appropriate for such a contextually sensitive activity as managing strategic change without reducing the change process to a mechanical and over-determined set of phases or stages and the activities of changing to a set of platitudinous generalities?”73
In seeking to answer this question, he draws on and extends the work of Johnston74 and highlights a number of stages to engaging in the management of change:75
•One is a problem-sensing stage, which is important in a highly political environment. This entails signaling and spreading throughout the organization, through discussion and decision making, the legitimacy of certain problems as requiring attention.
•Next is the development of concern about the problem, a process that involves establishing broad buy-in at a variety of levels throughout the organization. This is an educational process entailing meetings and data integration and providing space and opportunity for people to challenge conventional wisdom.
•The third stage involves gaining acknowledgment and understanding of the importance of the problem. This period entails a persistent championing role and is important to enable new rationalities to emerge alongside new diagnoses of problems and solutions.
•A planning and acting stage involves clarifying future directions and objectives and putting in place transition managers to enable the transition to occur. This involves senior management establishing a tension within the organization between the current state of things and what is needed for the future; middle managers need to use this tension to create momentum for change through establishing targets and the like.
•Finally, stabilizing change, or “making things which happen stick,”76 includes changing the organization’s systems (HR, IT, etc.) in order to reinforce and support the changes.
These stages are reminiscent of the “n-step” prescriptions of change management models. Yet, in a later book, Pettigrew and Whipp77 wrestle with the question of how change should be managed. Drawing on seven case studies of companies involved in strategic change, they reaffirm the relevance of the above stages in managing change.78 However, they conclude that their studies question “any easy unitary notions of managing change and competition.”79 Returning to the ICI study, what is interesting is that Pettigrew’s book is over 500 pages in length, but the discussion of the process of how managers can achieve strategic change occupies only six pages (pages 471–76). This imbalance points to the
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difficulty of processual approaches in providing a menu-driven way of achieving organizational change. This is not surprising given the messiness of change processes to which they point and the difficulties of controlling all of these in any change process. In this regard, it is probably fair to say that the processual approach is probably better at providing a detailed analysis and understanding of change retrospectively rather than prescriptively providing steps for the change manager to follow in any detailed manner.
Indeed, when another writer in this tradition, Patrick Dawson, did provide a prescriptive set of steps for achieving organization change, he was later criticized for this for falling back on the logic of change management approaches and failing to convey the subtleties and complexities of change that processual approaches uncover.80 In responding to such criticisms, Dawson’s later work makes clear that he does not seek to offer managers prescriptions for achieving successful change.81 Instead, he tries to establish the “practical value” of the processual approach in a reflective way, urging managers of change to gain an awareness of the critical change issues facing them rather than providing them with prescriptive change management recipes.82 He lists 10 “lessons”:83
1.Simple, linear change recipes should be challenged.
2.Change strategies will need to be adapted in light of the reactions and politics they create.
3.Change takes time and is unlikely to entail continual improvement.
4.Taken-for-granted assumptions need to be questioned along the way.
5.Change managers need to learn from stories of experiences of change, including those of individuals at all levels.
6.Training programs need to be aligned with desired changes.
7.Communication needs to occur in context, sensitive to competing narratives and political processes.
8.The substance of change is itself likely to alter as it unfolds in line with other internal and external contexts.
9.Political processes will be central to how quickly change outcomes occur.
10.Change involves interwoven, often contradictory processes as well as rewriting of accounts of the past and expectations of the future.
In work that Dawson published in 2005, he develops further the last of his 10 “lessons.” In case studies of technological change in two Australian organizations, along with his colleague David Buchanan, he argues that there are competing narratives (e.g., among managers, supervisors, and staff) relating to change, and these narratives can vary over time. Some narratives may tell a positive story, squeezing out other less-than-positive narratives of the change. Subsequently, the dominant narrative may be treated as if that’s “the way it really happened.”84 In this sense, the process of the change is known through the narrative of its telling. Narratives can therefore become political resources that can shape decisions about change, the planning of change, and the extent to which it is successful. It is not how authentic a narrative is but rather how influential it becomes: “The compelling narrative is a major shaper of technological change and warrants investigation over time (before, during and after), rather than as a snapshot analysis at a particular moment of time.”85
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While these lessons have interesting and intuitive value, they may be less appealing to change managers seeking solutions and specific guidelines for producing change. Change managers are likely to find the processual approach both illuminating—identifying the undercurrents of change, the shifting terrain that can only be partially controlled in any change process—and frustrating—that how they should move from reflection and “lessons” to action is not well specified. This remains, perhaps, the greatest challenge of the processual approach. While its strength is clearly of an analytical, academic understanding of the political, cultural, and contextual messiness of change, how this gets translated into practice for managers of change is likely to be fertile ground for future work in this tradition.
Conclusion
The change management and contingency approaches were associated in Chapter 2 with a director image of managing organizational change. While recognizing that all images represent a simplification of any position, the director image points to the underlying assumption of these two approaches that by following a predetermined set of steps, intended change outcomes can be achieved. What is clear is that there are a variety of change management models upon which the manager of change may draw; what is less clear are the criteria that they should use in making this selection.
This situation has led some change writers to compare and contrast change management models to see what they have in common. This is based on a view that suggests that many of the change management models specify very similar change steps and that it is possible to integrate them into an over-arching, common model; for example, see Leppitt and Mento, Jones, and Dirndorfer in Table 8.1.
Other change writers take a different direction and point to a deeper issue in relation to these models: that they are often based on very thin empirical evidence. For example, in Pettigrew’s86 critique of Ghoshal and Bartlett’s “three Rs” change model, he points to the lack of systematic evidence presented in support of it. He argues that their model is based on conjecture so that “it is difficult for the reader to disentangle what the authors have found empirically from what they would like to see.”87
One key challenge is for change management models to therefore provide a firmer footing in the form of systematic rather than anecdotal empirical evidence to support the advice they offer. Choosing among the many change management models based on the empirical evidence presented by their proponents (who has used them? with what successs? under what conditions? with what limitations?) is therefore another way in which managers of organizational change can deal with the proliferation of competing change models.
In Chapter 2, we identified the processual approach with the navigator image of managing organizational change. The navigator image accepts that management of change will always be in part unpredictable, with events impinging upon change processes over which they have only limited control. For example, Kanter, Stein, and Jick88 point to the case of Northwest Airlines and the way, in the mid-1980s, the plan for cultural change was disrupted by its acquisition of Republic Airlines, which was followed by union-led strikes over the mismanagement of the merger. Later, the crash of Northwest flight 255—in which 156 people were killed after taking off from Detroit—compounded their problems. Then,
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toward the end of the 1990s, Northwest was itself subject to a hostile takeover, and then a more friendly takeover—which nevertheless saw most of Northwest senior management resign. As Kanter, Stein, and Jick89comment, “So much for planned changes.”
It is therefore up to the navigator to steer a path between that which is intended and controllable and that which is unanticipated and emerges along the way. Of interest to this position is the argument by Pettigrew90 that we should abandon dichotomization of change outcomes into either planned or emergent. Rather, we should identify “the mutualities and complementarities of planned and emergent change.”91Ironically, this may be best achieved at the level of the practicing change manager; as Weick notes, for middle managers, exactly what constitutes “emergent and planned change begin to become indistinguishable” as they deal with “fragments of frontline detail and fragments of a bigger picture.”92
In this chapter and the previous one, we have identified differing approaches to managing organizational change. For the reflective managers of change, we suggest that they remain open to the insights offered from each of these approaches. This does not mean that “anything goes” but rather that they remain open to seeing “what goes best” in any change situation. Alternatively, it remains open to them to develop their own approach to managing change that draws upon the ones offered in these chapters. As Jean Bartunek says: “The ability to discern between competing approaches to change and their likely value may be one of the most important skills for managers to learn.”93
TABLE 8.3
Chapter Reflections for the Practicing Change Manager
• Do you work with a one-size-fits-all approach to managing change? To what extent do you match your change approach to the scale, timing, and readiness of your staff to the change?
• How skilled are you in adopting more than one change style? On what skills do you need to work more in order to achieve this flexibility? Are you more comfortable managing top-down, bottom-up, or somewhere between these two?
• Is there a dominant change mode in your organization? If so, how appropriate is it? What would you need to do to replace it or modify it with another approach?
• How do you deal with multiple changes that are simultaneously present in your business unit but are at different stages and phases?
Supplemental Reading
Beer, M., and Nohria, N. 2000.Resolving the tension between theories E and O of change. In Breaking the code of change, ed. M. Beer and N. Nohria, 1–33. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Dawson, P. 2003. Understanding organizational change: The contemporary experience of people at work. London: Sage.
Farias, G., and Johnson, H. 2000. Organizational development and change management: Setting the record straight. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 36(3):376–79.
Gallos, J. V., ed. 2006. Organization development: A Jossey-Bass reader. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
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Ghoshal, S., and Bartlett, C. A. 2000.Rebuilding behavioral context: A blueprint for corporate renewal. In Breaking the code of change, ed. M. Beer and N. Nohria, 195–222. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Helfat, C. E., Finkelstein, S., Mitchell, W., Peteraf, M. A., Singh, H., Teece, D. J., and Winter, S. G. 2007. Dynamic capabilities: Understanding strategic change in organizations. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Huy, Q. N. 2001.Time, temporal capability, and planned change. Academy of Management Review 26(4):601–23.
Lawler, E. E., III, and Worley, C. G. 2006. Built to change: How to achieve sustained organizational effectiveness. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Pettigrew, A. M., Woodman, R. W., and Cameron, K. S. 2001. Studying organizational change and development: Challenges for future research. Academy of Management Journal 44(4):697–713.
Poole, M. S., and Van de Ven, A. H., eds. 2004. Handbook of organizational change and innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stace, D., and Dunphy, D. 2001. Beyond the boundaries: Leading and recreating the successful enterprise. 2nd ed. Sydney: McGraw-Hill.
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Case Study The British Airways Swipe Card Debacle
THE STRIKE
On Friday, July 18, 2003, British Airways (BA) staff in Terminals 1 and 4 at London’s busy Heathrow Airport held a 24-hour wildcat strike. The strike was not officially sanctioned by the trade unions but was a spontaneous action by over 250 check-in staff who walked out at 4 p.m. The wildcat strike occurred at the start of a peak holiday season weekend, which led to chaotic scenes at Heathrow. Some 60 departure flights were grounded and over 10,000 passengers left stranded.94 The situation was heralded as the worst industrial situation BA had faced since 1997 when a strike was called by its cabin crew.95 BA’s response was to cancel its services from both terminals, apologize for the disruption, and ask those who were due to fly not to go to the airport as they would be unable to service them.96 BA also set up a tent outside Heathrow to provide refreshments and police were called in to manage the crowd.97 BA was criticized by many American visitors who were trying to fly back to the United States for not providing them with sufficient information about what was going on.98 Staff returned to work on Saturday evening, but the effects of the strike flowed on through the weekend. By Monday morning, July 21, BA reported that Heathrow was still extremely busy: “There is still a large backlog of more than 1,000 passengers from services cancelled over the weekend. We are doing everything we can to get these passengers away in the next couple of days.”99
As a result of the strike, BA lost around £40 million and its reputation was severely dented. The strike also came at a time when BA was still recovering from other environmental jolts such as 9/11, the Iraqi war, SARS, and inroads on its markets from budget airlines.100 Afterwards, BA revealed that it lost over 100,000 customers as a result of the dispute.101
THE CHANGE ISSUE: SWIPE CARDS
BA staff were protesting the introduction of a system for electronic clocking-in that would record when they started and finished work for the day. Staff were concerned that the system would enable managers to manipulate their working patterns and shift hours. The clocking-in system was one small part of a broader restructuring program in BA, titled the Future Size and Shape recovery program.102 Over the previous two years, this had led to approximately 13,000, or almost one in four jobs, being cut within the airline. As The Economist noted, the side effects of these cuts were emerging, with delayed departures resulting from a shortage of ground staff at Gatwick and “a high rate of sickness causing the airline to hire in aircraft and crew to fill gaps. Rising absenteeism is a sure sign of stress in an organization that is contracting.”103
For BA management, introduction of the swipe card system was a way of modernizing BA and “improving the efficient use of staff and resources.”104 As one BA official was quoted as saying: “We needed to simplify things and bring in the best system to manage people.”105
For staff it was seen as a “prelude to a radical shake-up in working hours, which would lead to loss of pay and demands to work split shifts.”106 As one check-in worker was quoted as saying: “This used to be a job which we loved but we are now at the end of our tether. What comes next? They will probably force us to swap shifts without agreement and all this for less money than working at Tesco [a supermarket].”107
One writer argued that “the heart of the issue is that the workforce wants respect”; it was not until the wildcat strike that CEO Rod Eddington was even aware that “there was a respect deficit to be plugged.” Specifically, staff were concerned that “BA will try to turn them into automata, leaving Heathrow at quiet times of the day only to be brought back at busiest moments, while not paying any extra for the disturbance. Women, in particular, want to preserve their carefully constructed capacity to balance the demands of work and home.”108 Although BA denied that the system would be used to make staff alter their working hours at little notice, staff did not accept this promise—wondering why it was being introduced in the first place if that was not the intended use. As one union official was quoted: “We know that BA breaks its agreements.”109 Another worker said that the strike was meant to be a “short, sharp, shock” for BA: “They would then be able to bring us in any time they wanted, which is just not on, especially for those of us with families.”110
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THE CHANGE PROCESS FOR INTRODUCING THE SWIPE CARD
Unions argued that the walkout was triggered by senior management at BA “abandoning talks over the introduction of smart cards and announcing their forced imposition at just five days’ notice.”111 It was this unilateral decision by BA to introduce the swipe card, and a lack of adequate consultation with affected staff, that was cited as a key reason for the strike.112 Even BA’s pilots, who did not oppose a check-in system, were said to be sympathetic “with the . . . check-in staff over the way that the airline had mishandled the introduction of the swipe cards.”113 One commentator labeled the change process as a “commercial disaster” serving as “an important warning—about the dangers of management by diktat, certainly, but, more profoundly, about an incipient revolt against the close control and monitoring of our lives and movements that modern information technology enables.”114
The Economist argued that management’s “big mistake was to introduce a new working practice at the start of the summer quarter when the airline makes all its money.”115 Similarly, The Times wrote that this was a major management blunder: “To pick July, the start of the peak holiday season, to launch an unpopular new clock-in system, is asking for trouble. To push through a scheme without realizing the extent of the resistance by those involved suggests a management aloof from the mood of its employees. And to allow managers to give contradictory statements on the use of the new cards seems guaranteed to foment mistrust.”116
As Hutton argued, with 20,000 other BA workers using the swipe card system, “Imposing them after months of inconclusive talks must have seemed—especially given the pressure to contain costs, with the airline set to report its worst ever quarterly loss of £60 million this week—a risk worth taking. It was a massive miscalculation of the workforce’s mood.”117 This miscalculation was related to staff cynicism and bitterness about the redundancy program that had been conducted, staff fears of a lack of consultation, poor pay rates, and dissatisfaction with management having enormous knowledge on which to act in the future.
The Guardian echoed this viewpoint, noting that the “trigger was undoubtedly the back-handed way BA management at Heathrow tried to force the introduction of swipe cards at exactly the wrong time, when the peak of the summer boom was approaching. They should have known how important it was to approach any potential changes in the working patterns of women juggling with childcare schedules in a very sensitive way.”118
Rod Eddington, chief executive of BA, acknowledged that it was wrong of his senior management to introduce the new clock-in system in the way they did; he was quoted as saying on BBC Radio, in response to a statement put to him that BA had been guilty of “bad management” and “crass stupidity” for not predicting the level of anger to the swipe card: “With the gift of hindsight, it’s difficult to disagree with you.”119
THE RESOLUTION
As a result of the walkout, BA announced on Tuesday, July 22, that it would hold talks with representatives from three unions—Amicus MSF, Transport and General Workers Union, and GMB—and put back introduction of the swipe cards until noon on Wednesday, July 23.120 Following further talks, it was finally announced on July 30 by BA that they had reached agreement with the unions to delay making the swipe card system operational until September 1. They also agreed to a 3 percent pay raise to administrative staff for 2003, not on the basis of introducing the swipe card system but based on being “confident that the remaining Future Size and Shape cost efficiencies will be delivered.”121
As one person observed: “You have to ask, how important was this scheme to the future operation of BA in the first place? How much money was it going to save and wouldn’t it be better to wait a few months for discussion to reassure the staff they are not going to get turned over?”122
Questions
Review the swipe card story, drawing on each of the following change perspectives discussed in Chapters 7 and 8:
• Organization development
• Sense-making
• Change management
• Contingency
• Processual
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1.From each change perspective, what are the key issues to understanding the wildcat strike?
2.Assume that you have been retained as a change consultant by BA management to advise them on how to avoid such a situation in the future. What lessons emerge from each perspective and what recommendations would you draw from each in constructing your advice to BA management? If appropriate, role-play the presentation of this advice to senior management of BA.
3.Is there one change perspective, or a combination of change perspectives, that provides the best way of understanding the swipe card issue? Why?
4.What broad conclusions emerge from this analysis?
TABLE 8.4
Additional Case Studies
Corporate Downsizing: The Ford and GM Approaches
ICFAI, IBS Research Centre, Kolkata. (2007)
Robotics, Resistance, and Revolution: Managing Change in a Hospital Pathology Dept.
Kingston Business School. (2007)
Canadian Fishing Company (A)
Wood, A. R., & Stuart, I. (1998) Richard Ivey School of Business
Play! Multimedia Case
Harder, J. W. (2001) Darden Business Publishing
State Farm Insurance–Michigan Region Multimedia case
Isabella, L. A., & Forbes, T. (2003) Darden Business Publishing
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Notes
1. Pettigrew, Woodman, and Cameron, 2001.
2. Palmer and Hardy, 2000:171–73.
3. Kirkpatrick, 2001:33.
4. Mento, Jones, and Dirndorfer, 2002:46.
5. Mento, Jones, and Dirndorfer, 2002:58.
6. Pendlebury, Grouard, and Meston, 1998:40–41.
7. Pendlebury, Grouard, and Meston, 1998:49.
8. Nadler, 1998.
9. Nadler, 1998:8.
10. Nadler, 1998:82–108.
11. Nadler, 1998:92.
12. Taffinder, 1998:40–42.
13. Anderson and Anderson, 2001:169.
14. Anderson and Anderson, 2001:170.
15. Ghoshal and Bartlett, 2000.
16. Ghoshal and Bartlett, 2000:196.
17. Ghoshal and Bartlett, 2000:199–200.
18. Ghoshal and Bartlett, 2000:220.
19. Ghoshal and Bartlett, 2000:221.
20. Kanter, Stein, and Jick, 1992:385–91.
21. Kanter, Stein, and Jick, 1992:389.
22. Kanter, Stein, and Jick, 1992:390.
23. Kanter, Stein, and Jick, 1992:390.
24. Kanter, Stein, and Jick, 1992:390.
25. Kanter, Stein, and Jick, 1992:392.
26. Kotter, 1995, 1996.
27. Kotter, 1996:ix.
28. Kotter, 1995:67.
29. Kotter, 1995:59.
30. Kotter, 2002:10–13.
31. See Kanter, Stein, and Jick, 1992:375–82.
32. Nicholl, 1998.
33. Church, 1999:2.
34. Church, 1999:2–3.
35. Deaner and Miller, 1998.
36. Herman, 2001:115.
37. Quinn, 1993, cited in Worren, Ruddle, and Moore, 1999:273–74.
38. Worren, Ruddle, and Moore, 1999:274–80.
39. Hornstein, 2001:224.
40. Farias and Johnson, 2000:377.
41. Farias and Johnson, 2000:378.
246
42. Worren, Ruddle, and Moore, 2000:381.
43. Nicholl, 1998.
44. Burnes, 2004:997.
45. Heracleous, 2000:77.
46. Sminia and van Nistelrooij, 2006.
47. Bradford and Burke, 2006:857.
48. For example, see Stace, 1996.
49. Stace, 1996:557.
50. See Stace and Dunphy, 2001:108–93.
51. Stace, 1996:561.
52. Stace, 1996:562.
53. Stace and Dunphy, 2001:108.
54. Stace, 1996:566.
55. Huy, 2001.
56. See Huy, 2001:610–11.
57. See Huy, 2001:612.
58. Sorge and van Witteloostuijn, 2004:1206.
59. Pettigrew, Woodman, and Cameron, 2001:704.
60. Leppitt, 2006:136.
61. Burnes, 1996:187.
62. Pettigrew, 1985:453.
63. Pettigrew, 1985:24.
64. Pettigrew, 1985:439.
65. Pettigrew, 1985:42–43.
66. Pettigrew, 1985:452–53.
67. Pettigrew, 1985:440.
68. Pettigrew, 1985:443.
69. Pettigrew, 1985:443.
70. Pettigrew, 1985:454.
71. Pettigrew, 1985:455.
72. Pettigrew, 1985:455.
73. Pettigrew, 1985:471.
74. Johnston, 1975.
75. Pettigrew, 1985:473–76.
76. Pettigrew, 1985:476.
77. Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991.
78. For example, see Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991:165–66, 280–81.
79. Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991:292.
80. Dawson, 2003:173.
81. Dawson, 2003:11.
82. Dawson, 2003:173.
83. Paraphrased from Dawson, 2003:173–76.
247
84. Dawson and Buchanan, 2005—this is the title of their article.
85. Dawson and Buchanan, 2005:862.
86. Pettigrew, 2000:247–49.
87. Pettigrew, 2000:249.
88. Kanter, Stein, and Jick, 1992:374.
89. Kanter, Stein, and Jick, 1992:374.
90. Pettigrew, 2000.
91. Pettigrew, 2000:246.
92. Weick, 2000:232.
93. Bartunek, 2003:xi.
94. Anonymous, 2003a.
95. Anonymous, 2003b.
96. British Airways, 2003a.
97. Anonymous, 2003c.
98. Anonymous, 2003b.
99. British Airways, 2003b.
100. Anonymous, 2003c.
101. Clark, 2003b.
102. British Airways, 2003e.
103. Anonymous, 2003c.
104. British Airways, 2003d.
105. Tran, 2003.
106. Behar, 2003. Reproduced with permission of Solo Syndication, Ltd.
107. Jones, 2003.
108. Hutton, 2003. Copyright Guardian News & Media Ltd, 2003.
109. Webster, 2003a.
110. McGreevy and Johnston, 2003.
111. Clark, 2003a.
112. Tran, 2003.
113. Webster, 2003b.
114. Hutton, 2003. Copyright Guardian News & Media Ltd, 2003.
115. Anonymous, 2003c.
116. Anonymous, 2003. Copyright © 2003 NI Syndication, London. Reproduced with permission.
117. Hutton, 2003. Copyright Guardian News & Media Ltd, 2003.
118. Anonymous, 2003. Copyright Guardian News & Media Ltd, 2003.
119. Clark, 2003a.
120. British Airways, 2003c.
121. British Airways, 2003d.
122. Behar, 2003. Reproduced with permission of Solo Syndication, Ltd.

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